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COMMENTS
FREE TRADE REALISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MARKET: TOWARDS A SENSIBLE, PRIVATELY-
ENFORCED ANTIDUMPING STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The unfair international trade practice commonly known as
"dumping" has been and remains one of the central concerns of
American international trade laws and of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT).1 Dumping is the trade
practice of selling a good produced in one country for a price lower
than its "normal value" or cost price in a different market.' The
trade laws Congress has enacted to fight illegal dumping have thus
far treated dumping either as "price discrimination which is prohib-
ited by the antitrust statutes or as violations of tariff laws to be pun-
ished by special import duties."' Dumping is a concern of American
trade law because it injures domestic producers who must either
lower their prices below the would-be market equilibrium (or margi-
1. GATT is the primary international treaty governing free global trade. See Bruce A.
Ortwine, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and After
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076, 1076-96 (1981).
2. Id. at 1076-78. Ortwine defines dumping in international trade as follows:
Dumping is an international trade practice whereby a product from one
country is sold in another country for less than its price in its own country. The
country where the item is manufactured or otherwise produced is the exporting
country or country of origin. The price of the item in the domestic market of the
exporting country is the item's fair market value. The country which receives
the item through international commerce is the importing country or country of
destination. The exporting country is said to be "dumping" its goods into the
market of the importing country.
Id. at 1077; see also CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES, How WE ALLOWED
JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD 38 (1988). See generally JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1966).
3. Steven D. Irwin, Revitalizing A Private Right of Action In Antidumping Cases, 17
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 847, 848 (1985); see Richard I. Hiscocks, International Price
Discrimination: The Discovery of the Predatory Dumping Act of 1916, 11 INT'L LAW. 227
(1977).
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nal cost price)4 to compete against the dumped goods or lose their
market share.' This form of unfair competition or pricing strategy
inevitably bankrupts domestic firms.6
This situation is similar to the "predatory" price discrimination
strategies' outlawed by our domestic antitrust laws, whereby a firm
4. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS (1990).
Demand is a schedule of prices and the quantities individuals are willing and
able to purchase at each price. One might determine demand by asking individ-
uals how many units of a good they would buy at one price. The amounts
would be added to get the total amount demanded at that price. Then the same
question could be asked about a series of higher and lower prices. We would
have a list of prices and the amounts that would be demanded at each price....
Supply is the converse of demand. It is a schedule of prices and the amounts
sellers are willing to make available to consumers at each price .... In a com-
petitive market, the market price of a good or service and the quantity sold are
determined by the interaction of demand and supply.
Id. §§ 2.02(A),(C).
The equilibrium price is the price where both price and quantity are the same on both
the supply and demand schedules or curves. This point also designates the equilibrium quan-
tity and is the point of competitive equilibrium. Id. § 2.02(C).
The term which is used to describe the way in which a firm's costs behave as it
increases output is "marginal cost." Marginal cost is the additional cost to a
firm of producing one more unit of output . . . . On the supply side of the
analysis, the firm's supply curve is the same as its marginal cost curve. The
reasoning is that the number of units a firm offers at a particular price depends
on a comparison of the price offered with the marginal cost of producing an
additional item. It will offer a particular unit as long as the addition to total cost
(marginal cost) does not exceed the price offered. Thus, the firm's marginal cost
curve also indicates the number of units that will be offered for sale at each
price.
The firm's output is determined in the same manner as output was deter-
mined for the industry as a whole; it settles on the quantity where demand and
supply intersect.
Id. §§ 2.02(B),(C).
In calculating costs of production, economists include a "normal" retuin to investors. Id.
§ 2.02(E).
5. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 847-48 n.8; Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 1983:
Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 127 and S. 418, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
38 (1983) (prepared statement of Thomas C. Graham on behalf of the American Iron & Steel
Institute (hereinafter AISI)).
6. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 848 n.8 citing Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 1983:
Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 127 and S. 418, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
38 (1983).
7. "Predatory" price discrimination is a pricing strategy that is followed, despite short-
term losses, because it is expected to drive competitors out of the market place, or alternatively,
to exclude potential competitors from entering the market. For information on predatory intent
and a discussion of what type of pricing behavior ought to constitute predatory pricing, see
Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy,
89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Re-
lated Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975) [hereinaf-
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with market power sells at a loss to squeeze out competitors.8 Once
the firm monopolizes the market or acquires enough of the market to
be the "price setter," the firm raises prices to maximize profits. This
practice injures the consumer because the monopolist produces less
and charges a higher price.9 Firms that subsidize their exports (usu-
ally with government backing) follow this dumping strategy through
monopoly profits gained in their home markets where antitrust laws
either do not exist or are regularly ignored.1"
As the international analog to domestic antitrust law," the An-
tidumping Revenue Act of 191612 (hereinafter the 1916 Act) is inad-
ter Predatory Pricing and Related Practices]; F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sher-
man Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976); F.M. Scherer, Some
Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976).
8. Joseph Gregory Sidak, A Framework for Administering The 1916 Antidumping
Act: Lessons from Antitrust Economics, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 377, 382-83 (1982).
9. See SULLIVIAN, supra note 4, §§ 2.03-.04; PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 38.
10. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 847-48 n.8. See generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2
(Prestowitz chronicles in depth the American and Japanese trading relationship, explaining
the very different understanding of open markets and free trade, as well as the organization
and alliance relationship in Japan between the government and business). Professor Philip J.
Jimenez commented that the Japanese have antitrust laws on their books but that in Japan
these are regarded much as ceremonial swords in one's home would be; you might take them
off the wall and show them to your guests, but no one would ever contemplate actually using
them. Professor Philip J. Jimenez, Lecture to the International Business Transactions class,
Santa Clara University School of Law (Fall, 1991).
11. Jeffrey L. Kessler, The Antidumping Act of 1916: Antitrust Analogue or Anath-
ema?, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 485 (1987).
12. Antidumping Revenue Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988) (enacted as part of the
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916)). The 1916 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any
articles from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and system-
atically to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the
United States at a price substantially less than the actual market value or
wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the United States,
in the principal markets of the country of their production, or of other foreign
countries to which they are commonly exported after adding to such market
value or wholesale price, freight, duty, and other charges and expenses necessa-
rily incident to the importation and sale thereof in the United States: Provided,
that such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an indus-
try in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the
United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce
in such articles in the United States.
Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to
violate this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of any violation
of, or combination or conspiracy to violate, this section, may sue therefor in the
district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant resides
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equate for maintaining a competitive marketplace1" or providing do-
mestic producers with an effective private cause of action against
unfair foreign dumping.14 There have been several unsuccessful at-
tempts to revise the 1916 Act.15 Legislative reformulation of an effec-
tive private right of action is essential for the interests of the Ameri-
can producer and consumer, as well as national economic interests.
This comment discusses the availability of a private cause of
action against the dumping of goods imported into the United States
marketplace and the currently inadequate status of such a cause of
action.' This comment further discusses the need for legislation that
gives life to this important cause of action. Such legislation is neces-
sary to protect the domestic commercial sector against unfair foreign
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages sustained, and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive the proper State
courts of jurisdiction in actions for damages thereunder.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (1916).
13. The goal of antitrust law is to ensure competitiveness in the marketplace according
to the principles of the ideal, perfectly competitive market model. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON,
supra note 4, § 1.01.
Antitrust is the study of competition. It is the body of law that seeks to assure
competitive markets through the interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic
process of exchange. For example, as a consumer, you are motivated by a desire
to purchase products at the highest quality and lowest price. Through purchases
you seek to maximize your satisfaction. Sellers of products, in turn, attempt to
determine what consumers will buy and how to supply products at the highest
quality and best prices. They also attempt to produce those products by expend-
ing the least amount of resources.
Id.
14. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
15. Known as the Unfair Foreign Competition Act, Senator Arlen Specter first intro-
duced the bill as S. 2167, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S1589 (daily ed. Mar. 4,
1982). Then the bill was reintroduced as S. 418, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S987
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983); S. 236, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S476 (daily ed. Jan.
22, 1985); and S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S11,647 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1985). See Irwin, supra note 3, at 854 nn. 39-44 and accompanying text. House Bill S. 1655
died in committee. See 1 CONG. REC. S21,030 (1985-1986). In 1987, attempts to modify the
1916 Act were made under the Omnibus Trade Bill, (H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.(1987)),
but the House and Senate, each having passed separate versions of the trade bill, did not agree
on a uniform version of the bill to pass during the 1987 legislative session. See House and
Senate Pass Omnibus Trade Bill, 1987 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 640, 640-56. It was not until the
next year that Congress cleared the trade bill (H.R. 4848, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); the
Omnibus Trade Bill became Public Law No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988)), but this
watered-down version did not contain the previously proposed 1916 Act amendments. See Af-
ter Three Years, Trade Bill Finally Clears, 1988 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 209, 209-11. See also
Sidak supra note 8, at 379 n.8 (discussing other previously proposed bills).
16. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
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trade practices."7 The current legal framework greatly favors unfair
dumping and largely ignores the needs of domestic producers."8 The
American consumer-oriented, market-driven model should take into
account that most people in society wear one hat as producers in the
work place and another hat as consumers. Hence, when domestic
producers are economically damaged, consumers also suffer in the
form of lower wages or unemployment.1 9 An effective private cause
of action against dumping is indispensable to protect domestic pro-
ducers against foreign traders who regularly violate dumping laws20
in order to avoid the result of injuring and driving out of the market
efficient and competitive American firms.21 However, it is also im-
portant to make sure that our laws do not go so far as to become
protectionist, thereby reducing healthy competition."2
The best solution to the current shortcomings of the antidump-
ing legislation is to enact a new antidumping measure, to replace the
1916 Act, which would provide a meaningful private civil remedy to
injured domestic producers.28 Primarily, this remedy should take into
account the goal of antitrust law, which is to ensure a competitive
market.24 In addition, it should take into account the unique
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text and parts II. D-1II. If we fail to protect
our domestic business against unfair trade practices, efficient firms will be forced out of the
market and unemployment will result. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2 at 38.
18. See infra part IV. A-C.
19. Dumping can have the effect of exporting unemployment. See PRESTOWITZ, supra
note 2, at 38.
20. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 26-70. "There can be no doubt that dumping
occurs, as demonstrated by the more than sixty countervailing duty orders in effect." Irwin,
supra note 3, at 847 n.8 (citing Memorandum from Chris Parlin, Deputy to Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Import Administration, Department of Commerce to Michael Russell, Counsel,
Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice (Sept. 3, 1985) (relating to countervailing duty or-
ders in effect) (on file at the office of LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus).
21. See generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2.
22. See generally Howard M. Metzenbaum & Kelly Signs, International Competitive-
ness: Changing the Rules or Changing the Will?, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 271
(1991)(arguing that protectionist policies aimed at relaxing the United States antitrust laws
and increasing industrial-government cooperation is not the answer to strengthening American
international competitiveness).
23. See infra parts IV. C-G, V..
24. Although a full discussion of the problems addressed by antitrust law is beyond the
scope of this comment, an understanding of the goals of antitrust law and of the type of
problems antitrust law addresses is helpful. Antitrust law seeks to maintain a competitive mar-
ketplace. One of the most important features of a competitive market is that buyers and sellers
act independently. This independence allows consumers to have a choice among competing
products of varying quality and price. If sellers of a product were allowed to act in concert and
collectively set prices or restrict the level of the product they provided to the consumers, choice
would be limited and a consumer would be forced to pay more for a product. See SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 4, §§ 1.01-.02.
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problems that exist in the international marketplace.25
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Big-Picture Hypothetical2"
An American firm, HyperTech, produces a technologically ad-
A major problem at the center of debate in antitrust law is whether a given antitrust law will
serve its purpose of ensuring a competitive marketplace, thereby enhancing consumer welfare,
or whether it will result in "judicial errors" that would reduce consumer welfare. There are
basically two types of judicial errors: A false positive, or type I, error and a false negative, or
type It, error. In discussing the 1916 Act from an economic perspective, Professor Sidak ex-
plains that:
A false positive, or type I, error occurs when the Act prohibits pricing behavior
that, far from injuring consumers, is competitively neutral or welfare enhancing.
A false negative, or type II, error occurs when the Act fails to prohibit pricing
behavior that is in fact likely to injure consumers by driving domestic producers
from the market, to the point where foreign producers can then charge
supracompetitive prices.
Joseph G. Sidak, A Framework for Administering The 1916 Antidumping Act: Lessons from
Antitrust Economics, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 377, 379 (1982).
25. See infra part IV. F. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Rethinking the Relationship
Between Antidumping and Antitrust Laws, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 277 (1991)(argu-
ing for a reinterpretation of the antidumping legislation that would harmonize it with the
antitrust laws). A reinterpretation of the antidumping laws would be a good start to solving
some of the past problems, but it would only be a start.
26. The following hypothetical is based upon historical accounts of the television, ma-
chine tool, pager, semiconductor and other markets and industries as told by PRESTOWITZ,
supra note 2. This hypothetical is a simplified account meant to give the reader a broad pic-
ture of the overall trade problems that exist between the American and Japanese trade systems
or models. This picture points out many existing problems. The focus of this comment, how-
ever, is restricted to one narrow area, that of dumping and the lack of a private cause of action
against foreign dumping. This comment acknowledges that there are many trade problems,
including many that are attributable to factors beyond our trade laws. However, this comment
focuses on the problem of dumping because of the severe impact dumping has had on Ameri-
can industry.
In order to adequately understand the dumping problem, it is important to take notice of the
larger trade picture. Trade between Japan and the United States is used as the model for this
analysis. The reason is that behind many of America's trade problems such as a $362 billion
dollar deficit (Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The Great Compression, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 30-Jan. 6 1992, at 107, 107) lies Japan and its non-free-trade economy. See James Fal-
lows, Japan: Playing by Different Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, September 1987, at 22; see
generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2. The fact that other nations are increasingly turning to
Japan's government-guided economic model as a template to follow in building their own
economies is a cause for great concern. Jim Impoco, With Communism Dead, Now It's Capi-
talist vs. Capitalist: The United States and Japan are Competing Role Models, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 30-Jan. 6, 1992, at 50, 50. If American policies and laws do not address
the problems created by our different economic models, our existing trade problems will get
increasingly worse. This comment takes a step towards addressing the problems resulting from
our differing economic models by discussing the need to protect our domestic market against
dumping, one of the characteristics of Japan's economic model. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note
2, at 58.
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vanced computer flight simulator, StarJet. HyperTech has a virtual
monopoly on these flight simulators in the domestic market because
of its superior technology. A few small domestic competitors are
catching up, however. Hypertech wants to expand its StarJet market
abroad to the nation of Asiana so that it can establish a market posi-
tion before its domestic competitors can compete. However,
HyperTech finds that many of the foreign markets to which it wants
to expand are effectively closed.27 To sell its StarJet flight simulator
abroad, HyperTech must license its technology to foreign businesses.
Reasoning that the profit potential in the foreign market of Asiana is
great, that HyperTech will have a substantial market share, and that
it probably will have further developed its designs and simulation
technology to a higher level, HyperTech licenses its technology to
27. For an interesting discussion of the Japanese market and the lasting effects of its
formerly closed nature see T.J. Pempel, Too Late for Just Free Trade, Japan: Some 'Affirma-
tive Action' to Heal Past Wounds Would Benefit Both of Us, WASH. POST, Dec., 1991, at C5.
Pempel argues that the debate over how open the Japanese market is today and discussion of
the changes that have taken place in the last decade to open the Japanese market to foreign
competition misses the real point.
Even if the Japanese market in 1991 is more open than that of most other
major. industrialized economies, from the 1950s until well into the early 1970s,
it was scarcely more open than Albania's. It is absurd for advocates of "the
market," whether Japanese or American, to downplay the importance of past
advantages and to assume that "competitiveness" is not cumulative. Such think-
ing is as myopic as considering it a fair race if, after running 20 miles in a
marathon, one runner is forced to race the last six miles against another who
now starts "even" with him, despite having ridden the first 20 miles in a chauf-
feur-driven Lexus.
The closed character of the Japanese market from the end of the U.S. Occupa-
tion until at least the early 1970s is beyond question. Imports of consumer and
manufactured goods were severely restricted. Government industrial policy pro-
vided special tax incentives, R&D assistance and exemption from anti-monopoly
regulations to targeted industries. Cartels and oligopolies among domestic pro-
ducers were officially encouraged. Foreign technology purchases underwent gov-
ernmental oversight designed to lower the costs to Japanese purchasers. Land
and capital were cheap. The yen was sharply undervalued, providing an im-
plicit subsidy to Japanese exporters and an impediment to foreign imports.
Thus, debate about when, and if, Japan's markets became truly opened to
Western goods and investment is less important than the fact that whatever
openings occurred took place long after U.S. and European firms would have
had their greatest cost effectiveness in Japan. They also occurred when the ex-
change rate between the yen and the dollar had long since made direct foreign
investment even more difficult. As a consequence of exchange rate variations
alone, start-up costs in dollars-whether for land, plants or salaries-for firms
trying to enter Japan in the early 1990s are three times what they would have
been in 1970. What had been difficult politically in the 1950s and 1960s had
become almost impossible economically by the 1990s.
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AsiaTech, an Asianan firm. 8 However, HyperTech finds that severe
restrictions are put on the level of its imports in order to protect the
"fragile" Asianan industry.
In the meantime, HyperTech's licensed technology is being de-
veloped by AsiaTech with the help of its government and a govern-
ment-sponsored industrial cartel. When AsiaTech starts to produce
its version of StarJet, it quickly captures ninety-five percent of the
Asiana market share, despite its inferior quality. Before long, with
the help of government investment and government purchasing to
increase production volume (and thereby lower costs), AsiaTech is
manufacturing a StarJet model of equal quality to that made by
28. In criticizing American industry for the decline of America as the world industrial
leader, many have pointed to the "stupidity" of licensing technology as one factor. There is
some truth to this and other criticisms. However, there is a great deal more behind both the
technology story and the decline of American industry. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 202.
In some cases the Japanese simply copied American designs. See Id. at 48. The story behind
the licensing of technology is illustrated by the following example of Interlink Electronics, a
small venture firm in Santa Barbara, California:
Its (Interlink's) product is a force-sensitive resistor which is used in a vari-
ety of electronic instruments. Interlink's founder invented the product and has
patents in the United States and Europe. The patents applied for in Japan had
not been issued by that time (summer of 1987). Suddenly we found that a pro-
spective Japanese customer, the Roland Company, to whom we had given sig-
nificant technical data, had asked the Toshiba Silicon Company to make our
product, which it was now doing while processing a competing patent applica-
tion in Japan.
What were we to do? Toshiba Silicon could object to our patent under Japan's
procedures and tie us up in litigation for years at heavy expense, which it could
bear more easily than we. Meanwhile, it could sell the product in Japan. We
could sue to prevent sale in the United States, but that too would entail time
and expense we could little afford. After we threatened to make the case a trade
issue, Toshiba Silicon expressed an interest in a licensing arrangement. We did
not really want such an arrangement, but the superior strength of Toshiba
Silicon made it an offer we had to consider. This scenario was played out
thousands of times as the long delay in patent issuing and the lack of an effec-
tive judicial appeals system in Japan worked to the disadvantage of the United
States. The system, and the lack of any U.S. government response to it, siphons
off U.S. technology, particularly of small venture firms.
Id. at 207.
In some cases, the U.S. government has actually been responsible for simply giving away
American technology (an incredibly stupid policy that clearly demonstrates the low status
American industry has been accorded by our government). The first semiconductor, which was
invented by AT&T's Bell Laboratories (a regulated monopoly under U.S. antitrust law at the
time), was made available to both domestic and foreign entities by the government. No other
government follows such a technology policy. See Id. at 29. An even more striking example of
the stupidity of the American government regarding the transfer abroad of technology is that
its own laboratories (such as the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories) actually helped the Japa-
nese develop and test their supercomputers. Id. at 136, 317. At the same time, U.S. supercom-
puter makers such as Cray Research, Inc. were closed out of the Japanese market. Id. at 136.
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HyperTech.
The Asiana government and AsiaTech know that the American
market is the largest consumer market in the world, and they need to
capture a large share of it to generate a large enough production
volume to be cost-competitive in the world market. AsiaTech
launches an aggressive export campaign targeting the open and eas-
ily accessible U.S. market. Since AsiaTech is a late entrant into the
American market, its start-up costs and lower production volume
make its production costs higher than those of HyperTech. However,
AsiaTech knows that the American consumer likes bargains and is
driven by short-term gain. Hence, AsiaTech saturates the American
market with extremely low-priced, Asiana-produced StarJet models.
Its prices are far below current HyperTech prices or prices in its
own home market (Asiana). Consumers respond as expected by buy-
ing large quantities of AsiaTech's cheap StarJets, and AsiaTech
quickly captures a large segment of the American market.
HyperTech loses a large share of its market, but by reducing costs
and investment in new plants, equipment, and research and develop-
ment (hereinafter R&D), HyperTech lowers its own prices and re-
tains a substantial share of the market. In fact, HyperTech manages
to increase sales volume in the American market because of the rap-
idly growing demand for StarJet flight simulators resulting from
growth in the military and airline industries.
Nevertheless, HyperTech realizes that AsiaTech's extremely
low prices are well below production costs and that AsiaTech is
"dumping" its Asiana-produced StarJets into the American market.
Dumping is illegal under various U.S. laws.29 The dumping is injur-
ing HyperTech by decreasing its profit margin and eating away its
market share. HyperTech complains to the U.S. government that
AsiaTech is breaking U.S. trade law and violating the rules of
GATT."0 With the exception of the ineffective 1916 Act, U.S.
dumping laws are administratively enforced, so HyperTech must
rely on the U.S. government to enforce them."l However, because of
competing political interests and misperceptions about the interna-
tional economic model, the U.S. government permits the dumping to
continue. The government concludes that it would be best not to en-
force these laws too aggressively, since Asiana is an ally and the
United States does not want to label Asiana firms "unfair." Further-
29. See infra part II. B.
30. For a general discussion of GATT and other international antidumping agreements
see Ortwine, supra note 1 at 1080-89.
31. See infra part II. B.
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more, HyperTech does not appear to be seriously injured by the
dumping, because its sales have increased. Additionally, the govern-
ment reasons that the dumping is actually beneficial, as it is a cheap
source of StarJets for the American consumer.
Despite the fact that HyperTech had increased its sales volume
and showed a profit that year, in effect, they were doomed without
government action against the dumping. That HyperTech would be-
come a memory in the StarJet industry within a few short years is
explained by what is known as the experience curve." The doubling
of production and sales of a product reduces the total cost of taking
the product to the market place by twenty to thirty percent. 8 Even
though HyperTech has been experiencing a growth in sales and even
a moderate growth in overall market share of the still-expanding
market, AsiaTech is growing at a greater rate than HyperTech.
Therefore, AsiaTech's costs are falling faster than HyperTech's
while it increases its market share at a greater rate than HyperTech.
Spurred on by its increasingly lower costs, AsiaTech continues to
lower its costs until it finally overtakes HyperTech.
With a larger share of the market than HyperTech, AsiaTech
has become the low-cost producer of StarJets. With AsiaTech's low
prices, HyperTech must sell at lower prices and face increasingly
lower profits, resulting in less capital for investment. However, any
significant decrease in investment for more efficient plants and
equipment, and for R&D (especially in a rapidly developing high-
technology field such as that of StarJets), would result in falling be-
hind the competition. Not only would HyperTech's StarJets become
a lower quality product, but AsiaTech's higher level of research and
development spending would likely enable AsiaTech to take the lead
in the race to be the first to develop and produce newer and more
advanced generations of StarJets, thereby eventually making
HyperTech's StarJet technology and designs obsolete. HyperTech,
facing pressure from investors to show a profit, and realizing that it
cannot retain its StarJet market share without substantial losses, ex-
its the StarJet market to explore new product markets. 4
Why did the U.S. antidumping laws not protect HyperTech
against AsiaTech's illegal dumping? Various antidumping laws exist
in the U.S., but they do not deter foreign firms from dumping their
goods on the U.S. market. 5 The following sections are an introduc-
32. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 40-44.
33. See id. at 40.
34. See supra note 26.
35. See infra parts II. D-II. B.
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tion to the antidumping trade laws.
B. Current Dumping Measures
The 1916 Act was the first antidumping law enacted in the
United States.36 Dumping is an important concern of our trade and
antitrust laws (which seek to maintain a competitive marketplace) 7
and is "defined as price discrimination between purchasers in differ-
ent national markets." 8 It was not until sixty-four years after the
1916 Act was passed that a court decided a case on the merits under
the Act in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. 9 No claimant has ever won an action under the Act.40
The 1916 Act is the only antidumping statute that provides for
a private remedy to dumping."' Subsequent statutes have provided
for administrative imposition of duties in the amount of the price
difference between the sale price of a product in the United States,
the importing country, and the fair market value of the product in
the exporting country."2 The first of these statutes, the Antidumping
36. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 848.
37. For an explanation of a competitive market see supra note 4.
38. See VINER, supra note 2, at 4. For a general discussion on dumping, see supra
notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
39. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa.
1980), affid in part and rev'd in part, In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 723 F. 2d 319 (3d Cir. Pa. 1983); See Sidak, supra note 8, at 378.
40. There have been relatively few cases involving the 1916 Act, and only a small num-
ber of actions brought by the government under the criminal provisions of the statute, "none of
which has been successful or given rise to a reported judicial decision." See Kessler, supra note
11, at 487 n.l; Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp at 1212. The only case that has dealt with
the substantive issues of the 1916 Act in depth is a highly complex and prolonged action
brought by the Zenith Radio Corporation and the National Union Electric Corporation
against a group of the biggest Japanese consumer electronics producers, including the giant
Matsushita Electric Industrial, Hitachi, Sharp Electronics, Sanyo Electronics, and Sony corpo-
rations. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 491-93; In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litiga-
tion, D.C. MDL 189 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
For other cases construing the 1916 Act, see Western Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui & Co.
(U.S.A.), Inc., 760 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1985) (standing); H. Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74
F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1935) (limiting pretrial discovery); Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G.,
83 F.R.D. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (ordering discovery); Smokey's of Tulsa, Inc. v. American
Honda Motor Co., 453 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (interpreting venue); Isra Fruit Ltd.
v. Agrexco Agric. Export Co., 631 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (standing); Jewel Foliage
Co. v. Uniflora Overseas Florida, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (standing);
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 471 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (standing), aff d,
637 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1980); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del.
1978) (requirement of foreign sale); Bywater v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas.
(CCH) P73,759 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (standing).
41. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 849.
42. See id. at 849-51. See generally Ortwine, supra note 1, at 1076-1107.
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Act of 1921 (hereinafter the 1921 Act), was passed because of the
burdensome predatory intent"' requirement of the 1916 Act, which
was extremely difficult to satisfy."" Under the 1921 Act, it was un-
necessary to show predatory intent, requiring only proof of injury,
and violations resulted in the imposition of duties. 5 The 1921 Act
has been repealed and replaced by the Trade Agreements Act of
1979,"' but it has not provided adequate relief or protection to do-
mestic producers for most of the same reasons that the 1921 Act was
inadequate."7
The following sections examine the 1916 Act. Such examination
is helpful both in understanding the intended purposes of a privately
enforceable antidumping statute and in considering the shortcomings
of the 1916 Act.
C. The 1916 Act
1. Elements of the 1916 Act
The 1916 Act provides for both criminal and civil penalties to
any person 8 "commonly and systematically" importing or assisting
in the importation or sale of any goods into the United States at
prices substantially below "actual market value or wholesale price"
in the country of their production, plus costs of importation. 9 These
acts of importation or sale must be done with the intent of destroying
or injuring an existing industry in the United States, preventing the
establishment of such an industry, or restraining or monopolizing
trade.5 0
To establish a violation of the 1916 Act, a party must prove
several elements. First, a party must prove that the imported articles
43. The purpose or intent of predatory or "short-run" dumping is to eliminate competi-
tors, prevent competitors from entering the market, get an initial foothold in a new market, or
prevent losing ground to a competitor in a market. See Ortwine, supra note 1, at 1077-78.
44. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 849.
45. See id.
46. See Ortwine, supra note 1, at 1076.
47. See id. at 1076-1107. See generally Michael P. Mabile, Regional Industry Analysis
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings: The International Trade Commis-
sion's Evolving Approach, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 625 (1992)(discussing the International Trade
Commission's disregard for Congressional drafting into the 1921 Act of analyzing injury using
a regional injury approach).
48. The term "person" includes partnerships, corporations, and associations. 15 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1976).




being sold are comparable products to those produced domestically.5"
The imported items being sold need not be identical but must be at
least "equivalent from the standpoint of 'consumer utility.' "52 The
second element requires that the item allegedly being dumped is be-
ing sold in a market outside the United States at an "actual market
value" or "wholesale price" that can be compared to the U.S. market
price.5" The party must also prove that the U.S. price is substan-
tially below the value of the item in the foreign market or its whole-
sale price.54 The last element is the "predatory pricing" intent re-
quirement.55 It has been argued that this requires the same type of
intent required under the Robinson-Patman Act" and Section 2 of
the Sherman Act,57 although no court has ever directly decided this
point.58 To prove predatory intent, there must be price discrimina-
tion that substantially lessens competition or tends to create a mo-
nopoly.59 Prices below those of the home market are not predatory in
intent if they reflect "an effort to meet competition, to sell off obso-
lete products, to get a foothold in a new market, or to account for
legitimate differences in costs between selling the product in the
51. Id.; see also Kessler, supra note 11, at 486.
52. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 486.
53. See id.
54. The article being sold must be "commonly and systematically" sold at prices sub-
stantially below market value or wholesale price. Occasional instances of sales below accepted
levels are not actionable under the 1916 Act. See id.
55. See id. at 487; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F.
Supp. 251, 259 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (discussing the meaning of the intent requirement under the
1916 Act). For a discussion on predatory pricing in antitrust law, see supra note 7.
56. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act is Section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended,
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is 49 Stat. 1528
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION, CASES AND
MATERIALS 1157 (3d ed. 1990). Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides in relevant
part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality .... and where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition. ...
Id.
The issues concerning predatory pricing under the Clayton Act are basically the same as
those under section 2 of the Sherman Act. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 7, at 697 n.1,
724-28.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). For a discussion of the intent required, see Areeda & Turner,
supra note 7.
58. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 487.
59. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13.
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United States and other markets." 0
2. Legislative History of the 1916 Act
The legislative history of the 1916 Act is of limited usefulness
in understanding the intent of Congress in enacting the 1916 Act."'
The 1916 Act was one of eight provisions in the Revenue Act of
1916,6" and the House Report contains the only comment providing
any insight into Congressional intent regarding the antidumping
provision; "the provision was proposed so that foreign manufacturers
selling in the United States 'may be placed in the same position as
our manufacturers with reference to unfair competition.' "6 This re-
mark indicates Congressional awareness that foreign competitors
could injure American producers if the anti-competitive behavior of
foreign competitors was not restricted. Therefore, Congress sought to
curtail anti-competitive or predatory dumping in enacting the 1916
Act.6 4
The historical context and contemporary commentary of the
1916 Act provide further insight into the intent behind the 1916
Act.6 The political atmosphere existing before the enactment of the
1916 Act was laden with opposition toward cartels and monopolies.66
After enacting Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which prohibited anti-
competitive price discrimination in the domestic market, 7 Congress
focused on similar anti-competitive behavior by foreign firms.66
One reason for concern over anti-competitive behavior of for-
eign firms was that antitrust forces were pushing for a reduction of
tariffs with the goal of increasing the level of competition for domes-
tic cartels. 69 This reduction of tariffs, however, meant that as the
level of foreign competition increased, American business would be
increasingly vulnerable to anti-competitive behavior of foreign
firms.7 1 Secretary of Commerce William Redfield proposed an an-
tidumping provision (which became the 1916 Act) because he feared
that European products would be dumped on the U.S. market, de-
60. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 487.
61. See Sidak, supra note 8, at 380-81.
62. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
63. See Sidak, supra note 8, at 381.
64. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 489.
65. See Sidak, supra note 8, at 381.
66. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 488.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 13.
68. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 489.




stroying competition so "that the victor may exploit the field at
will." 7'
Two of the proponents of the 1916 Act were the American dye
and chemical industries, which were afraid of being injured by Eu-
ropean dumping. 2 A statement by the Secretary of the Manufactur-
ing Chemists Association of the United States sheds some light on
the probable purpose of the 1916 Act. The Secretary requested that
legislation be enacted that would "prevent 'acts of unfair competition
* . .not 'dumping' in the ordinary sense. I do not mean the mere act
of underselling, but I mean the act of importing goods into this coun-
try with the intent and for the purpose of ruining a small competi-
tor.' ,,73 There is some debate as to whether the 1916 Act was meant
to parallel the Sherman or the Clayton Act. 7' However, what is im-
portant is that the purpose was not to protect against foreign compe-
tition, but to protect against unfair competition from predatory Eu-
ropean cartels.75  The Act did not target legitimate price
competition. 6
Following is a summary of the history of the semiconductor in-
dustry and the problems it faced from dumping computer chips from
the late seventies to the mid-eighties as described by former Coun-
selor for Japan Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce, Clyde V.
Prestowitz, Jr., one of the most highly respected experts in the area
of trade between the United States and Japan. This history high-
lights some of the problems with the current administrative an-
tidumping enforcement framework.
D. The Administrative Framework and The Case of
Semiconductors
In 1978-79, the Japanese introduced their first 16K random ac-
cess memory (hereinafter RAM) chips into the global market. The
Japanese had great success with their 16K chips and almost immedi-
ately gained forty percent of the market share. One of the biggest
reasons for their success was that they were dumping the chips on
71. See Sidak, supra note 8, at 386 (citing the 1915 Secretary of Commerce Annual
Report 42).
72. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 489-90.
73. See id. at 490 n.24.
74. For an argument that the 1916 Act parallels the Sherman Act, see Sidak, supra note
8, at 381-90.
75. See id. at 390; see also Ortwine, supra note 1, at 1078 n.14 (Congress feared that
predation by European cartels could injure or destroy smaller American firms).
76. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 489.
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the market. 7
The Japanese knew that to become cost-competitive in this im-
portant product of the semiconductor industry, 78 they needed to gain
a large share of the U.S. 16K RAM market. Since the Japanese
were late entrants into the market, their costs of production were
higher than the production costs for American producers. To lower
those costs, the Japanese needed to substantially increase production
volume, since costs drop as production levels rise. The Japanese
knew that the best way to increase production volume was to dump
their chips on the large U.S. market, which would respond to the
low prices by buying large quantities of the bargain-priced chips.7 9
In 1980, when American semiconductor producers threatened to
take legal action by filing a petition with the government, the Japa-
nese raised their prices a little. By then, they had already increased
their market share enough to achieve the volume needed to be cost-
competitive. The Japanese also introduced their next generation of
chips, the 64K RAM chip, in 1980. The Japanese were second only
to IBM in introducing this new generation of semiconductor chip.
Firms such as Motorola, Texas Instruments, and Intel did not intro-
duce their 64K RAMs for another six months to a year. By the end
of 1980, the Japanese had taken the lead in the semiconductor in-
dustry when they introduced the first 256K RAM prototype in the
world."0 Having taken the lead in technology, the Japanese contin-
ued their aggressive dumping tactics and quickly began to take over
the world RAM market.8"
The prices for American RAM chips were falling twenty to
77. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 38.
78. The Japanese often target "key items" or what are known as "technology drivers."
For instance, the RAM is the technology driver for the semiconductor industry:
They [the Japanese) knew that the RAM is the linchpin of the semicon-
ductor industry because, as the best-selling device, it generates not only revenue
but also the long production runs plant managers use to test, stabilize, and re-
fine their production and quality-control processes. Compared with many other
chips, it is a relatively simple product, which makes it a more attractive vehicle
for developing new techniques. The latest technology has always been incorpo-
rated first in RAMs, which have always been the first product to appear as a
new generation. Once RAMs are refined, new generations of other products
follow. Thus the 64K RAM was followed by the 64K EPROM (electrical,
programmable read only memory), the 64K SPRAM (static RAM), and so
forth. The Japanese knew that if they could capture the lead in RAMs, they
would be well on the way to overall semiconductor superiority.
See id. at 40.
79. See id. 38.
80. Id. at 39.
81. Id. at 39, 46.
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thirty percent each year. 2 This drop was due to the experience
curve;83 as chip production increased due to the quickly growing de-
mand,84 chip costs fell. However, the prices of the Japanese 64K
RAM chips dropped eighty percent in 1981.' 5 Clearly, the Japanese
were not making a profit and were dumping.88 In fact, the Japanese
lost twice as much money as the Americans in their struggle to domi-
nate the semiconductor industry, but they would win the contest of
deep pockets. 87 American firms could not compete in this environ-
ment and quickly started dropping out of the unprofitable- market.
At the same time, all of the Japanese producers stayed in the mar-
ket.88 Where was the protection of the administratively enforced an-
tidumping laws?
1. Semiconductors and the Administrative Fiasco
The semiconductor industry did not file a formal complaint to
have the administrative antidumping laws enforced through a law-
suit. The industry reasoned that the legal proceedings would have
been costly, and more importantly, they would have taken too long to
be of any help in the rapidly changing semiconductor industry." By
the time a decision would have been made on the dumping of one
generation of chips (i.e., 16K, 64K, etc.), that generation's life cycle
would have ended and the next generation of chips could be dumped
without having any duties levied on it.90 Instead, the semiconductor
industry opted to have the government attempt to enforce the law
through negotiation with the Japanese.91
In the fall of 1981, representatives of the American semiconduc-
tor industry began making trips to Washington D.C. to ask for an
end to the dumping.92
82. Id. at 47.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
84. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2 at 38.
85. Id. at 47.
86. Id. at 46-47.
87. See id. 55.
88. Id. at 46. There had been 14 American firms producing the 1K RAM chip, 15 firms
producing the 4K RAM chip, and 12 firms producing the 16K RAM chip. When the effect of
the Japanese dumping took its toll on the American chip producers, however, most firms were
forced out of the unprofitable market and only two American firms were able to stay in the
market to produce the 64K RAM. Id.
89. Id. at 49.
90. See id. at 49, 60-61.
91. See id at 50.
92. See id. at 47.
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They got a reception as cool as the autumn weather in Wash-
ington. The lawyers, academic economists, and career bureau-
crats who filled many key government positions shared a suspi-
cion of business as protectionist and opposed to consumer
interests. To them, the semiconductor industry seemed healthy:
while it might have problems in one or two areas, over all it
was 50 percent bigger than the Japanese industry and remained
profitable, while growing much faster than most U.S. industries.
Few officials understood the experience curve and that an in-
dustry could be dying even while growing rapidly if in the pro-
cess it was losing market share to even faster growing competi-
tors who were eroding its technological advantage.9"
In response to the requests that the dumping stop, the Com-
merce Department's Lionel Olmer, who was responsible for ad-
ministering the antidumping laws, did take some action. He warned
the Japanese that the Commerce Department would monitor chip
prices. This warning improved the situation for a short time until
the Justice Department, in an incredibly ill-conceived move illustrat-
ing the lack of cooperation and coordination between the various ad-
ministrative branches, started to investigate the Japanese for violat-
ing antitrust laws. The Justice Department interpreted price
increases by the Japanese firms, resulting from the warning not to
dump from the Commerce Department, as collusion to raise prices
in the U.S. market.9 What followed was a series of ineffectual nego-
tiations that only enabled the Japanese to buy enough time to fur-
ther erode the American semiconductor industry.9 5 By 1985, the
Japanese had ninety percent of the world RAM market and began
their conquest of the rest of the semiconductor field (such as memory
devices known as "EPROMs" or electrical programmable read-only
memory chips).9 6
2. Semiconductors and the Legal Battle
By 1985-86, the U.S. semiconductor industry, with close to two
billion dollars in losses and twenty-five thousand unemployed people,
was devastated. As a final desperate measure, the semiconductor in-
dustry decided to take legal action and filed a dumping action re-
garding EPROMs. 9' The Japanese, however, knew from past expe-
93. Id. at 48-49.
94. See id. at 49.
95. See generally id. at 46-55.
96. See id. at 54.
97. See id. at 55.
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rience that the State Department and the National Security Council
would oppose the Commerce Department in any legal actions
against them.9 The U.S. trade deficit hit 150 billion dollars on Sep-
tember 19, 1985, and with mounting political pressure to do some-
thing about the trade problem, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm
Baldridge accepted a recommendation for the U.S. government to in-
itiate its own dumping action regarding 256K RAMs.99 There was
evidence that the Japanese were dumping 64K and 256K chips on a
massive scale on the U.S. market at prices well below the cost of
production. This was the first time that the U.S. government, of its
own initiative, undertook to start an antidumping action. However,
this action was viewed primarily as a move to gain political negotiat-
ing leverage against the Japanese, who could potentially lose billions
of dollars.'
There was a great deal of resistance from various administrative
branches against the Commerce Department for attempting to start
the dumping action:
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE'S OFFICE: Things are
really popping behind the scenes in our discussions with the
Japanese. We're getting all kinds of calls and we ought to han-
dle them carefully. Let's see what emerges before we launch
any missiles. [... (Rather than being concerned with the health
of the semiconductor industry or with enforcing the antidump-
ing laws,) The official feared Baldridge might take some of the
negotiating responsibility away from the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative's office.] ...
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: We have to keep in
mind SDI [the Strategic Defense Initiative, better known as
"Star Wars"]. We think Japan will endorse SDI and we don't
want to do anything that would undermine that. Besides, we are
more creative than the Japanese. IBM is way ahead of them.
[Of course, IBM had just told us it was not.]
STATE DEPARTMENT: Isn't it mostly the fault of our com-
panies? I heard that they just took the wrong track in product
development. If we do this, are we moving toward an industrial
policy?
TREASURY DEPARTMENT I: Exactly. Dumping benefits
the society receiving it. If we decide we want this industry, no
matter what, we are making industrial policy.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT II: Secretary Baldridge is
98. See id. at 56.
99. See id. at 56-57.
100. See id. at 57.
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right. We know Japan is predatory. The argument that we are
more creative sounds like what the United Kingdom says about
itself. .... 101
However, due to mounting political pressure over the trade defi-
cit, by January of 1986 the U.S. government had started its an-
tidumping action regarding 256K chips, and was further pursuing
two petitions from the semiconductor industry: one regarding 64K
chips and one regarding EPROMs.'0 2 On March 17 and 19, 1986,
the Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission
made a formal finding that the Japanese were dumping at prices
that were half of the cost of production.' 3 However, instead of fol-
lowing through with the imposition of fines, a political solution was
reached when a deal was struck on July 30, 1986, resulting in an
agreement to increase Japanese market access and to prevent dump-
ing in violation of the rules of GATT."0 4 In the end, this agreement,
like those before it, yielded no significant results. The Japanese en-
ded up dominating the semiconductor industry that the Americans
had pioneered.'
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The 1916 Act is an impotent antidumping weapon that provides
no effective means of redress to injured American producers who suf-
fer great economic injury from the unfair trade practice of dumping
by foreign producers. The administrative antidumping laws do not
101. See id. at 59-60.
102. See id. at 58-61.
103. See id. at 64.
104. See id. at 64-65.
105. See id. at 65-70. Following the example of Japan's successful dumping strategy,
other countries such as Korea have tried to enter the American market through dumping. This
time, however, the Commerce Department in October of 1992 stepped in and imposed dump-
ing duties that vary from 6 to 87 percent. Rebecca Smith, DRAM Prices Jump After Firms
Cited, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 23, 1992, at IF. How long these duties will continue to be
imposed and what effect they will have remains to be seen.
It appears that as the political lobby of American industry has voiced complaints of unfairness,
the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, this time from a position favoring foreign
dumpers to a protectionist stance. Since 1988, 97% of dumping complaints before the Com-
merce Department have been successful. David Frum, Dump It, FoRBEs, Sept. 28, 1992, at
64. While this protectionist stance might be better than allowing all dumping to take place
(putting American business out of business), it is clearly not a good solution, because moving
too far toward protectionism decreases healthy competition. This decrease in competition hurts
the consumer and decreases efficiency. The lesson to learn from the previous failure to protect
against dumping is not that we need extreme protectionism, but that we need to remove an-




adequately fill the void left by the absence of an effective private
antidumping cause of action and are themselves ineffective as a rem-
edy to domestic producers injured by dumping. The American com-
petitive market model recognizes that inefficient firms will not sur-
vive.106 However, when efficient firms, such as HyperTech in the
hypothetical above, are forced to exit the market because of unfair
trade practices such as dumping, the competitiveness of the American
marketplace is injured to the benefit of foreign producers.
When American producers are hurt by unfair trade practices,
the results are that efficient firms do not make profits and eventually
go bankrupt, investors lose money, and workers lose their jobs."' On
a large scale, this means that the aggregate economic losses of the
American producers, investors, and workers cause a decline in Amer-
ican productivity, an increasingly depressed economy, and a lowering
of the American standard of living.'0 8 This economic decline is not
part of a cycle, because unlike the usual type of economic decline, it
is not corrected simply by the marketplace adjusting into a more effi-
cient posture. In effect, the American market was in its most efficient
posture during the boom years before and after World War
II'9-before it started to feel the effects of unfair competition. How-
ever, because American laws fail to protect against international mo-
nopolistic and cartel strategies, many of the most important markets
have been taken out of the American marketplace." 0 These effects
will be felt many years hence. It is imperative that the United States
learn a lesson from the past and act immediately to provide effective
antidumping legislation against any further dumping.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Ineffectiveness of the 1916 Act
The 1916 Act has been completely ineffective as a legal weapon
to combat dumping. This is evidenced by comparing the relatively
small number of cases brought under the Act "' with the frequency
106. See Fallows, supra note 26, at 24. Competitive capitalism assumes that markets
will continually re-adjust-through bankruptcies, new entrants into markets, job changes, un-
employment, shifts into new business-in order to maintain a dynamic, competitive market-
place that will result in greater efficiency.
107. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
108. See generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2.
109. Id. at 3-4.
110. See id. at 233, 3-25, 217-49, 305-11.
111. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 852-53.
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that dumping occurs. " 2 The infrequent use of the 1916 Act does not
mean that little or no dumping exists in the American import mar-
ket. There is, in fact, strong evidence that dumping frequently takes
place."' The history of the 1916 Act reflects both its structural
shortcomings" 4 and its limited focus as a predatory dumping statute
as it has been interpreted under its legislative history." 5 These fac-
tors, taken together, have effectively resulted in the unavailability of
a private right of action against harmful and unfair dumping prac-
tices. Only three years after the 1916 Act was enacted, the U.S.
Tariff Commission reported that it was ineffective as a deterrent to
dumping by foreign firms." 6 There are a number of reasons why the
1916 Act has been ineffective, two of which are particularly
important.
One reason for the ineffectiveness of the 1916 Act is the diffi-
culty in obtaining the necessary evidence." The court in H. Wagner
& Adler Co. v. Mali"' limited pretrial discovery in civil actions
under the 1916 Act. It did so on the grounds that since the 1916 Act
was both a criminal and a civil statute, the Fifth Amendment limited
the plaintiff's discovery of evidence that would incriminate the de-
fendant." 9 Hence, the construction of the 1916 Act as both a crimi-
nal and a civil statute has severely handicapped potential plaintiffs
in obtaining evidence necessary to support a private action under the
1916 Act.
The second and stronger reason the 1916 Act has been ineffec-
tive is the difficulty of proving the predatory intent element. 20 This
element is particularly difficult to prove and given the additional
burden of the Fifth Amendment limitation on discovery discussed
immediately above, it is not surprising that the 1916 Act has been
ineffective in deterring dumping.
Due to the difficulty of proving the requisite predatory dumping
intent required under the 1916 Act and the need to address other
112. See id. at 847 n.8.
113. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2; Irwin, supra note 3, citing Unfair Foreign Competi-
tion Act of 1983: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 127 and S. 418, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983)
114. See infra text accompanying notes 117-23.
115. See supra part I. C. 2.
116. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 853 n.34.
117. See Hiscocks, supra note 3, at 232.
118. H. Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1935).
119. See Hiscocks, supra note 3, at 230-31.
120. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 853.
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forms of dumping, Congress enacted the 1921 Act six years later.12 1
Despite the fact that the 1921 Act required petitioning the govern-
ment (since it was administratively enforced), it offered a more at-
tractive remedy to dumping because the burdensome intent require-
ment was removed in the 1921 Act. 22 Hence, although the 1916 Act
is still on the books today, the 1921 Act effectively displaced the
1916 Act.1 2
3
However, the displacement of the 1916 Act by administratively
enforced antidumping laws (first the 1921 Act and later the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979) has not resolved the dumping problem. A
discussion of the inadequacies of the administratively enforced legal
framework points out reasons why it would be better to correct the
deficiencies of the 1916 Act and return to a privately enforced an-
tidumping framework than to continue under the current adminis-
trative system.
B. Ineffectiveness of Administrative Antidumping Measures
When Matsushita, a Japanese firm, entered the U.S. market for
pagers in the early 1980s, it decided to pursue a dumping strat-
egy. 24 Matsushita was eventually found to be dumping in the U.S.
market. Nevertheless, the strategy was seen as a sound business deci-
sion by Matsushita. 25 Any penalty enforced against the company for
illegal dumping was simply a cost of doing business and did not stop
Matsushita from following this unfair trade strategy. 26 In consider-
ing the possibility of having to defend itself against an antidumping
action, Matsushita may have reasoned as follows:
Motorola might initiate an antidumping case but, if so, it will
cost them more money and will take more than a year to com-
plete. In that time, we [Matsushita] can take a large share of
the market, if not the whole market. If we lose the case, the
worst that can happen is that we have to raise our prices and
post a bond for the dumping duty, which won't be collected be-
cause we will have raised our prices [duties are only collected on
dumping which occurs after a firm is found to be dumping;
there are no retroactive duties]. Since we will have gotten a
large share of the market in the meantime, we won't be un-
121. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 490.
122. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 849.
123. See id. at 853.
124. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 238-39.
125. See id. at 238.
126. See id. at 237-38.
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happy about raising prices. That will allow us finally to make
some money. Even better, we can use the case as an excuse to
tell our customers how sorry we are to increase our prices, but
the U.S. government is making us do it.12
In planning its business strategy, Matsushita realized that there
were flaws in the U.S. legal framework, which it could use to its
advantage and later even use as an excuse to behave like a monopoly;
that is, to raise prices once it has gained a substantial market share.
Implicit in Matsushita's thinking when following a trade strat-
egy that includes a pricing strategy of dumping is a recognition of
three basic flaws in the administratively enforced legal framework.
These flaws are that the legal framework works too slowly, fails to
provide retroactive duties, and does not compensate the injured U.S.
industries (duties imposed flow to the United States Treasury, not
the industry that has initiated the action). 2 The fact that there are
no retroactive duties means that although a great deal of damage
might be done to an industry, by the time duties are imposed for
further dumping, there is no procedure available to redress past
injury.
Given the nature of the international trade market and the
openness of the American market, U.S. trade laws must respond
quickly to dumping on American markets. Otherwise, foreign dump-
ing will inflict irreparable damage on domestic industries before the
legislature responds. The current administrative framework has been
too slow in responding to sudden dumping on the American mar-
ket. 29 In addition, another problem with the administratively en-
forced legal framework is the incompetence of the administration 8 '
in enforcing the law against violators.13 1 A classic example is that of
the semiconductor industry discussed above.1 32
C. Lessons From The Antidumping Legal Framework
As discussed above, the only antidumping statute on the books
that provides for a private cause of action, the 1916 Act, requires the
127. See id. at 238.
128. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 849-51.
129. See id. at 849-50.
130. The term "administration" refers to the administrative framework in charge of
enforcing the dumping laws.
131. See generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2 (noting several examples of the incompe-
tence of the various administrative branches with regard to enforcing antidumping laws as well
as other trade laws).
132. See supra part II. D.
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plaintiff to prove predatory intent, a very difficult standard to sat-
isfy.13 In fact, in its present condition, the 1916 Act is the
equivalent of having no private cause of action at all. The adminis-
trative antidumping statutes, from the 1921 Act to the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979,134 do not fill the void left by the 1916 Act. They
fail to provide industries that are the victims of unfair dumping with
effective relief because of the three flaws discussed above, as well as
the role that politics play in the administrative framework. Domestic
industries victimized by unfair trade practices are often viewed with
suspicion. Pleas for help against dumping are seen as cries for pro-
tectionism. 35 Why does this system put American producers at such
a great disadvantage in protecting themselves from illegal dumping?
A look at some of the historical background of the antidumping laws
is helpful.
Enacted as a result of an anti-monopoly political sentiment, the
the 1916 Act was designed as part of a scheme that would both in-
crease foreign competitive pressure on cartels in the American do-
mestic market through the reduction of tariffs, and protect domestic
business from the resulting increased exposure to foreign predatory
dumping. 3 ' The legislative history of the 1916 Act reveals that it
was enacted out of concern that American business might become
victimized by predatory foreign cartels. 3 Yet it has not been effec-
tive in protecting American business from foreign dumping."8' The
logical result is that the American market was exposed to a higher
level of foreign competition due to the reduction of tariffs, but was
not afforded the intended protection from foreign dumping. As men-
tioned previously, the inability of the 1916 Act to deter dumping led
to passage of the 1921 Act, which by eliminating the intent require-
ment broadened the scope of U.S. antidumping laws to cover non-
predatory forms of dumping.'39 However, the many problems with
the administratively enforced antidumping statutes have left the
American marketplace unprotected from dumping by foreign
competitors.
The semiconductor lesson reveals that an administrative legal
framework does not work. Under the current antidumping legal sys-
133. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
135. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 46-50.
136. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 488.
137. See supra part II. C. 2.
138. See supra part IV. A.
139. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 490.
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tem, American business cannot feel that petitioning the government
to take legal action will result in meaningful action. The semicon-
ductor industry only filed a formal petition for legal action as a last
resort because the legal framework was seen as too slow and costly
(with no potential reward in the form of compensation to the injured
industry, as the U.S. Treasury gets all damages) to be meaningful.
Additionally, the process is enmeshed with political negotiations, in
which there are too many participants with conflicting agendas to be
effective. Furthermore, imposing duties is viewed as an unfriendly
political move and is therefore avoided when dealing with nations
that are seen as allies.14' It is not suggested that a hostile, protection-
ist stance should be taken against American trading partners. How-
ever, when foreign firms violate dumping laws, there should. be an
impartial and non-political means of redress available to the domes-
tic firms injured as a result of the unfair dumping.
Another important fact that should be noted is that no action
was taken under the 1916 Act. Clearly, American business does not
think that there exists any meaningful private cause of action to
combat dumping.
An understanding of the economic principles underlying Ameri-
can trade laws is important in analyzing why the current antidump-
ing legal framework fails to deter dumping.
D. Economic Models and the Principles Behind American Trade
Laws
All theoretical models are constructed as closed systems that op-
erate according to a set of laws or principles which, in the absence of
any outside interference or manipulation, achieve predictable results.
The theoretical economic model upon which the American economy
and its supporting trade laws are based is the free-trade competitive
market model based on the theories of economist Adam Smith.
141
According to this model, it is economically beneficial to all par-
ties if there is a high degree of trade and products are transferred
from low-cost to high-cost production markets.'4 2 The fewer restric-
tions there are on the flow of goods, the better off everyone in each
market will be. Each market will produce the goods it makes most
efficiently and export them, and import those goods it cannot pro-
140. See generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 239.
141. See id. at 230.
142. See Fallows, supra note 26, at 22.
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duce as efficiently. 4" In effect, trade promotes efficiency because it
allocates production of goods to efficient producers so that each coun-
try produces what it makes best. 44
Adam Smith's economic model further assumes as one of its
core principles that individuals will act as rational economic men
and women seeking the greatest amount of immediate short-term
consumer satisfaction based upon rational cost-benefit calculations.'
These economic individuals will respond to the market to get the best
bargain for themselves.' 46 As a result, each market will stop making
what it produces inefficiently and spend more of its resources pro-
ducing the goods it makes efficiently.' 4 7 This increases the level of
trade as consumers buy from the low-cost producers and higher-cost
producers shift into businesses where they will be the low-cost
producers. 4"
This model further assumes that everyone has the same goal of
getting "more." Not all consumers want the same things or quanti-
ties thereof, but each consumer will get the most of each item desired
according to his or her level of satisfaction or utility maximization.'49
Therefore, a free-trade economy is best because through the dynam-
ics of competition, it will provide each consumer with the most at a
lower cost. 5 Finally, the perfectly competitive market assumes that
there are many buyers and sellers each acting individually in uncoor-
dinated decision-making.' 5 '
Through the political process, American society has decided that
markets should behave according to these principles of competi-
tion.' 52 However, as is evidenced by the existence of American anti-
trust laws, not everyone behaves according to the principles of the
chosen theoretical models.'53 For instance, without antitrust laws to
restrict firms from acting together or colluding, the perfectly compet-
itive model would break down.' 5 ' Therefore, in order to protect the




146. See id. at 22-24.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 24.
150. See id.
151. See SULLIVIAN & HARRISON, supra note 4, § 2.02.
152. See id. §§ 1.01, 2.
153. See id.
154. See id. § 1.01.
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
that will be the most beneficial to society as a whole, it is necessary
for laws to protect against deviations from the principles of the so-
cially prescribed theoretical model.
Existing trade laws fail to protect adequately against violations
of free trade because they and their enforcers incorrectly assume that
foreign and domestic competitors have the same goal of consumer
satisfaction and that those competitors follow the same rules of free
trade as the American marketplace. In order to adequately resolve
the problem of dumping, an understanding of the intellectual errors
underlying the construction of the present legal trade framework is
necessary.
E. Underlying Reasons the Legal Framework Has Failed to
Adequately Protect the American Producer
One of the problems with the current legal framework is that it
and those in charge of enforcement assume an economic model along
the lines of our own free-trade model. 55 Under GATT, the different
economic models of Communist non-market economies were recog-
nized because they were seen as political opponents, 6 but the legal
framework should further recognize that not all capitalist countries
follow the laissez-faire trade doctrine of the United States. Most no-
table is the Japanese economic model. American laws do not account
for the different form of capitalism that the Japanese have developed
under the principles of strategic industries and industrial policy
rather than individualism."" It is difficult for Americans to think in
economic terms other than free trade and consumer welfare. How-
ever, at the heart of the Japanese economic model lies not a desire to
provide the consumer with the best bargain (a natural economic as-
sumption for most Americans), but a desire to preserve the social
status quo by maintaining the job of each Japanese citizen. 58 This
different social goal has created a different form of capitalism.
Because of the different social goals of the American and the
Japanese capitalist models, trade between the two countries has led
to, and will continue to result in, trade deficits for the United
States.'
155. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 237.
156. See id. at 231.
157. See id. at 237; see also Impoco, supra note 26, at 50 (discussing Japan's govern-
ment-guided industrial model).




To argue that Japan tends toward surplus does not mean that
its industries, managers, and workers are the "best" in the
world. Some of them may be; even so, free-trade theory assumes
that trade accounts would still balance out. If Japan really were
better at manufacturing than any other country, its exports
would keep rising and so (because of supply-demand forces on
the currency exchange) would the value of the yen. Goods from
the rest of the world would become cheaper; its people, wanting
"more," would recognize and seize these bargains. Equilibrium
would be restored. This is essentially what happened to
America in the generation after the Second World War. Our
industries were world-beaters; our dollars grew strong, and we
spent those dollars-and spent and spent. But the chronic trade
imbalance reflects something more than Japanese manufactur-
ing skill .... The Japanese consumer's interest comes last-and
therefore so does the motivation for buying from overseas.1"'
In structuring its different economic model, Japan has created
an economic structure that violates many of the principles of free
trade.' This has adversely affected Japan's trading partners, which
have been the victims of unfair trade practices, the natural results of
Japan's different economic structure. One of the unfair trade prac-
tices resulting from Japan's economic model is dumping.'62
Since American antidumping laws do not account for the Japa-
nese model of government-guided industrial strategy, they do not
deal with the problem effectively. American antidumping laws put a
heavy burden on domestic producers to prove that dumping is taking
place and that the dumping is causing severe injury to the produc-
ers.' As was discussed above," the legal framework is ineffective
in deterring dumping or providing adequate relief to the injured pro-
ducers because even if the injured producers were to prevail on their
claim, the legal procedures are slow, costly, and do not provide for
retroactive duties. The reason the American legal framework has
been formulated in this manner is that the underlying assumption is
that "dumping is a gift to the consumer, unless severe injury is
caused to a domestic industry . . . ", In determining the extent of
injury, as seen in the example of the semiconductor industry, the
administrative system has ignored and failed to understand both the
160. Id.
161. See generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2.
162. See id. at 58.
163. See id. at 237-38.
164. See supra part IV. A-B.
165. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 237-38.
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concept of the experience curve and the fact that even a growing
industry could be injured and facing eventual collapse. 6
Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. identifies three major reasons presi-
dents have been hesitant to use section 301, the unfair trade law. 6 '
(These three reasons also shed some light on possible reasons the
antidumping laws have been formulated in a manner that favors the
dumping parties and why the administrative bureaucrats have been
hesitant to enforce them.) The first is that since American laws as-
sume a laissez-faire economic model, these laws are not prepared to
address a "series of coordinated policies executed over a lengthy pe-
riod for the purpose of altering the entire international industrial
environment," which is the central feature of the Japanese economic
model.' 68 Thus, because the focus of American trade law is on the
behavior of individual firms attempting to monopolize markets, these
laws are not prepared to address the contingency of an entire state
targeting industries, as the Japanese indus.trial-policy economic
model has done.169
The second reason is that American laws assume the "essential
righteousness" of the American laissez-faire model. Therefore,
American laws address violations of the law only in terms of what is
right and wrong.
To obtain relief, a petitioner must first prove that his foreign
competitor is a liar and a cheat. Not surprisingly, when the
competitor resides in a friendly foreign country, a president [and
other branches of the executive are] typically reluctant to brand
it because to do so may involve branding the company's govern-
ment as well. 170
The last reason is that America has not viewed economic activ-
ity as being tied to matters of national security or welfare. There-
fore, trade matters are often subordinated to other international po-
litical concerns. 7 ' For instance, in the semiconductor example above,
the National Security Council was more interested in the Strategic
Defense Initiative than in the injury dumping was causing to the
American semiconductor industry.' 72 However, this is clearly an in-
correct approach to take because economic matters, such as losing
166. See id. at 40-44.
167. See id. at 239-40.
168. Id. at 239.
169. See id. at 239-40.
170. Id. at 239.
171. See id.
172. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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technological industries, can hurt the U.S. not only economically, but
also by making America lose technology useful for national
defense.1 "
One of the reasons American policy has made these mistakes is
that after the Second World War, America enjoyed great industrial
superiority over the rest of the world." 4 Therefore, America gave a
"handicap' 7 5 to the rest of the world in the assumption that it
would follow the American lead in opening borders by lowering tar-
iffs and following policies of free trade. However, many countries
either did not follow the American lead or did so slowly.' 76 As a
result, America's great superiority has dwindled largely because of
the policies of its own government. 171
History has shown that American trade laws must be sensitive
to matters of the international marketplace and that America is vul-
nerable to foreign industry's unfair trade practices. The law must be
reformulated under an internationally sensitive framework.
F. Recognizing the Unique Conditions of the International
Marketplace
In formulating trade laws, Americans have assumed that the
principles and trade practices of other industrialized nations are the
same as those of the United States.' 8 The model of competitive capi-
talism or laissez-faire, according to the American view, is the "best"
economic model; therefore, everyone should follow it or economic de-
pression will follow.'" 9
Under the American model, a government hands-off policy was
viewed as the best policy; it was not the place of government to give
advice on strategic business decisions. 80 The strongest and most in-
novative would prevail, while the weak and stagnant would fall by
the wayside. 8' The United States had grown, flourished, and en-
joyed great prosperity under these principles. This prosperity had
put her in a position as the world economic leader for the greater
part of a century, and it is because of this great prosperity that the
173. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 217-49.
174. See id. at 230-31.
175. For a discussion of the historical context and other background, see id. at 230-37.
176. See id. at 231.
177. See id. at 232, 3-7.
178. See supra part IV. E.
179. See Impoco, supra note 26, at 51.
180. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 32.
181. See Fallows, supra note 26, at 24.
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U.S. has always held its principles to be almighty.182 The situation
that now exists in the global marketplace (with America's huge trade
deficits) 8' is a sobering one giving cause to reassess the American
position. It brings to the forefront the need for a close inspection of
economic policy and misperceptions of the Japanese economic model.
The world thinks of Japan as a capitalist nation, and to an
extent it is. While its basic form is that of a Western capitalistic
nation, its internal structure and nationalistic nature is quite differ-
ent from that of other industrial countries." 4 When the Japanese
decided to enter the semiconductor industry, it was not simply the
decision of an ambitious Japanese entrepreneur.' 85 It was a decision
made by a coalition of Japanese businesses and the Japanese govern-
ment.' 86 The decision was part of a national interest policy that is an
integral part of Japan's socio-political structure:
The development of the electronics industry was not to be sim-
ply a matter of private enterprises seeking profitable new fields.
That element existed too, but the Japanese government had de-
cided that the electronics industry was too important to be left
only to businessmen. The Extraordinary Measures Law made
development a community effort with MITI leading the Japa-
nese wagon train to settle a new industrial territory. 87
This banding together of Japanese government and business has
outraged the American industrialists, who claim they are competing
against an entire nation, the famous Japan, Inc. Such a coalition
violates the American sense of 'fair play.' The United States has
failed to realize that Japanese society does not operate under the
same set of rules as does American society. What seems unfair to an
American is merely business as usual to somebody from Japan.' 88 It
is precisely for this reason that instead of fruitlessly trying to negoti-
ate with the Japanese to get them to behave like Americans, the
United States must adapt its rules to the international marketplace
and then allow injured companies to enforce these laws in the courts.
This will allow the United States to trade with nations such as Ja-
pan, that do not follow the principles of the competitive capitalistic
model, without injuring its domestic producers.
182. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 3-4, 230-32.
183. See Zuckerman, supra note 26, at 107.
184. See generally PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2.
185. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2 at 33.
186. See id. at 33-35.
187. See id. at 33.
188. See id. at 46-47.
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Having recognized that there are other types of economic mod-
els in the world, such as the Japanese government-guided, industrial
policy model, the United States should take the next step and adapt
its trade laws to account for these differences. American antidumping
laws cannot work in the same manner as domestic antitrust laws to
maintain a competitive marketplace. Since the United States cannot
make foreign governments follow the American economic model by
forbidding cartels and monopolies in their home markets, America
must ensure that its laws prevent foreign competitors from gaining
unfair advantages over its domestic industries, which are subject to
domestic antitrust laws. To begin, Congress should enact meaning-
ful, effective, antidumping law to protect domestic industries from
this unfair trade practice.
G. Reconciling Domestic Antitrust Legal Concerns With A Private
Antidumping Right of Action
Previous attempts to revitalize the 1916 Act have been criticized
by economists as posing a threat to competitive markets. 89 If done
properly, revitalization would not threaten a competitive market and
would rejuvenate the competitiveness of the American marketplace.
Joseph Sidak argued that Congress should repeal the 1916 Act
because judicial determinations that erred on the side of the plaintiffs
would have the effect of reducing price competition, hurting con-
sumer welfare.' 9 ° However, this analysis ignores considerations other
than those of the consumer. For instance, the fact that producers are
injured by dumping is brushed off by the following argument:
Suppose arguendo that Japanese television manufacturers de-
stroyed all American television manufacturers through pro-
longed predatory dumping, and thereafter significantly raised
their own prices in the United States. Suppose, too, that non-
Japanese foreign producers of televisions do not then shift into
the production of American televisions. American consumers or
entrepreneurs would, at some price, buy a non-Japanese foreign
television and modify it to American technical specifications,
rather than buy a television manufactured in Japan for use
here. American consumers would, in essence, partially vertically
integrate upward into television manufacturing ... The possi-
bility of such consumer-induced supply substitution would sub-
stantially constrain the market power and monopoly profits of
189. See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 8 (arguing that any private cause of action will impair
consumer welfare).
190. Id. at 390-404.
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even successful predatory dumpers. 101
This argument makes some interesting points. However, it also
ignores a great deal. First of all, this argument does not address the
costs of the workers who lose their jobs. Even if there was an indus-
try to which the television workers above could easily shift, the costs
of moving the worker's family to the new job location must be con-
sidered. There are also the costs of training workers for their new
jobs. Other factors ignored by this analysis are the costs to society in
paying unemployment compensation, stress-related health care, lost
wages, family problems related to moving and unemployment, and
lost tax revenues.19 Economists frequently forget that their theories
address real people.
Sidak's arguments also ignore the fact that potential competitors
might not re-enter the market if the goal of the predatory dumpers is
not to later charge monopoly profits, but simply to have the market
to themselves. For instance, if the goal of the Japanese is "the non-
capitalist desire to preserve every Japanese person's place in the
Japanese productive system"'193 rather than to maximize profits, then
the Japanese will not charge monopoly profits once they have run
the Americans out of the market. 94 Some argue that this will not
hurt consumers because they will not have to pay higher prices for
television sets. This logic ignores the fact that some of these consum-
ers used to work in the American television industry. In losing their
jobs, they are now poorer than before because they are not earning
wages. Therefore, they are injured as consumers since they cannot
afford the same level of prices they could previously afford when
they were working. Also, since the new producers of television sets
reside in a foreign country, the American standard of living will de-
cline as the wages earned and the profits realized flow overseas. This
is never included in Sidak's calculations. Clearly, it should be consid-
ered. Through dumping and other unfair trade practices, the Japa-
nese have inflicted a great deal of damage to a great number of
American industries.19 5
Another factor that could keep new entrants out of the market
is that potential entrants would realize that they could not compete
against foreign competitors able to collude and resume dumping as
191. Id. at 395-96.
192. See PREsrowiTz, supra note 2, at 232-33.
193. Fallows, supra note 26, at 24.
194. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 306.
195. See id. at 3-70, 187-249.
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soon as there was any threat of new entrants. If the foreign competi-
tors had previously dumped with impunity in order to monopolize
the market, there was nothing to stop them from dumping in order
to quickly destroy a firm attempting to re-enter the market.
Additionally, Sidak ignores the fact that foreign competitors
might not be following the same market model as the American com-
petitive market model. Economists are usually skeptical about
whether any firm would actually follow a predatory pricing
scheme. 9 The argument is that since unsuccessful predation is self-
punishing, it is also self-deterring. 9" However, this line of reasoning
does not account for the fact that in international trade, we are not
always dealing with individual firms. Japanese firms can afford to
follow dumping strategies because they have the backing of their
government, and firms often work together in government-sponsored
cartels. 98 Sidak's use of a 1919 report by the U.S. Tariff Commis-
sion stating that evidence of dumping is meager'99 does not undercut
the importance of deterring dumping. The world in 1919 looked
quite different than it looks today, and in the modern world there is
substantial evidence that dumping takes place.200
In formulating an effective private cause of action, however, we
should be sensitive to considerations of reducing competition by cre-
ating an overly protective statute. It is possible to avoid creating a
"protectionist" statute if the proper precautions are taken. The fol-
lowing proposal attempts to formulate the correct balance between
these competing interests.
V. PROPOSAL
The 1916 Act should be replaced by a new antidumping statute
that would not include any criminal provisions, but that would in-
clude a private civil cause of action that would provide for the
following:
1) Damages from the time "dumping" (as defined in part
3) began, including the legal costs of the suit plus the market
interest rate, to any party, injured as a result of:
2) The acts of any person importing any articles from any
foreign country into the United States,
196. See Sidak, supra note 8, at 400.
197. See id.
198. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 33, 73-184.
199. See Sidak, supra note 8, at 400.
200. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 2, at 26-70. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 847.
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3) At prices that are below the cost of production in the
home market, plus any additional costs incurred in bringing
them to market in the United States.
4) The calculation of the cost of production shall include
all fixed and variable costs of production.
5) A finding that the sale prices of a foreign competitor's
products are significantly less than the actual market value or
wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the
United States, in the principal markets of the country of their
production, or of other foreign countries, or of the United States
market,
6) Will result in a rebuttable presumption that dumping is
taking place.
7) This will facilitate discovery since the party with the
best access to the information on the cost of production will have
an incentive to produce that evidence if in fact they are not
dumping. Adequate time should be given to present such evi-
dence, and "constructed value" that forces the foreign competi-
tor to earn a profit higher than any domestic competitor should
not be used. 0 1
8) Additionally, if the Plaintiff wishes to put an injunctive
order on the product being allegedly dumped after a prelimi-
nary showing of prices below market value (as defined in part
5), this will be done immediately upon Plaintiff's request. This
order should not preclude all sales of the product by the De-
fendant. Rather, it should simply force the Defendant to sell at
prices equal to those of Defendant's domestic competitors until
the litigation is resolved.
9) This will prevent the possible length of the judicial pro-
ceedings from being used to the advantage of the dumping party
to continue inflicting injury on the plaintiff.
10) However, to prevent abuse by Plaintiffs using this stat-
ute as a weapon to protect themselves from legitimate price
competition,
11) A negative determination on dumping will result in the
Plaintiffs paying Defendant's reasonable attorney's fees and if
injunctive relief was sought, any resulting damages provable by
the Defendants.
12) In determining damages, injury will be found if any
market share has been lost as a result of the "dumped" import,
even if the Plaintiff's market share actually grew relative to the
rest of the industry.
13) No showing of lower sales or financial problems is
201. See Frum, supra note 105, at 64.
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needed as long as there has been a negative financial effect on
the Plaintiff's overall profits as a result of the "dumping."
A private cause of action would offer the advantage of removing
violations of the law from the political process. Politics are now in-
volved in determinations under the administratively enforced scheme.
Clearly, the administration is incompetent as an enforcer of the law.
The above statute would discourage dumping, while preserving legit-
imate price competition. Additionally, a private cause of action
would promote efficiency,2"2 fairness, predictability, stability, and ac-
curacy, and would give the parties a fair opportunity to have their
day in court.2"'
The intent requirement has been removed because all dumping,
whether predatory or not, is injurious to domestic producers and
does not promote legitimate price competition. Even sporadic dump-
ing2" 4 done for the purpose of reducing an oversupply of inventory is
not, strictly speaking, legitimate, as its purpose is to minimize losses
that are then passed on to competitors. If a factory cannot efficiently
run its operations, it should absorb its own losses or go out of busi-
ness. That is part of competitive capitalism. However, it is probably
unrealistic and unnecessary to attack this much less harmful type of
dumping. On the other hand, continuous dumping 05 is even more
injurious to domestic producers and should be subject to damages.
The proposition of economists that dumping benefits consumers0 6 is
short-sighted because it ignores the fact that consumers derive their
wealth from their role as producers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Past attempts to revise the 1916 Act have met with resistance
from the "anti-protectionist" lobby, which has feared a chill in com-
petition.2 0 7 This proposal is not in any way meant to be protectionist
in the sense of being anti-competitive. It can only be labeled protec-
tionist in the sense that it would protect the domestic system of com-
petitive capitalism by ensuring that, when they choose to enter the
American marketplace, foreign violators of free-trade principles are
subject to the same type of judicial enforcement as domestic violators
202. The injunctive provision of § 8 would provide for quick protection from dumping,
even if the litigation itself would be time-consuming.
203. See Irwin, supra note 3, at 869-76.
204. See VINER, supra note 2, at 23-28.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 494-96.
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are under domestic antitrust laws. Currently, foreign competitors
have the advantage of not being subject to the American antitrust
laws in their home markets.
Additionally, the fear that a private cause of action may "chill"
foreign competitors from entering the American market-place is ill-
founded, as the American market is the largest and most lucrative in
the world. Forcing foreign competitors to compete using legitimate
trade practices will only invigorate competition. The enactment of an
effective private antidumping cause of action in no way advocates a
restraint of fair trade or a threat to competitive capitalism. The real-
ity is quite the opposite. The lack of a private cause of action is a
threat to the American system of free trade. A new private cause of
action against the unfair trade practice of dumping would serve to
untie the previously bound hands of American business in dealing
with non-free-traders, aid in reducing the trade deficit, and enhance
the welfare of consumers, producers, and society as a whole.
Stephen F. Moller
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